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create a better world?
The crisis of science without wisdom 
Nicholas Maxwell
Can we learn to create a better world? Yes, if we first create tra-
ditions and institutions of learning rationally devoted to that
end. At present universities all over the world are dominated
by the idea that the basic aim of academic inquiry is to acquire
knowledge.  Such  a  conception  of  inquiry,  judged  from  the
standpoint of helping us learn wisdom and civilisation, is dam-
agingly irrational. We need to bring about a revolution in the
academic enterprise if we are to create a kind of inquiry ration-
ally devoted to helping us become more civilised. With this in
our  possession,  we  might  gradually  learn  how  to  make
progress towards a better world.
The  twentieth  century  witnessed  unprecedented  achieve-
ments; but it also saw unparalleled horrors: 10 million people
dead as a result of the First World War, 55 million as a result of
the  Second,  Stalin’s  purges  and  programmes  of  collectivisa-
tion,  Hitler’s  death  camps,  the  disasters  of  Mao’s  Cultural
Revolution. There was the insanity of the Cold War and the
nuclear arms race, which put the entire human race at risk.
There were the many hot wars after the end of the Second
World War. Well over 100 million people were killed in war
during the twentieth century, which compares unfavourably
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China’s  rape  of  Tibet,  the  Khmer  Rouge’s  devastation  of
Cambodia, the massacres of Rwanda and Burundi. Billions of
people  had  to  live  subjected  to  totalitarian  regimes,  facing
arbitrary arrest, imprisonment, torture and death if heard to
murmur the mildest protest.
There was the steady, daily, routine suffering and unneces-
sary  death  of  thousands  due  to  poverty  and  easily  curable
disease. It is estimated that a fifth of all people alive today still
live in conditions of abject poverty, without safe water, proper
shelter, adequate food, education or health care. 
A sustainable future?
And  then  there  is  our  treatment  of  the  rest  of  life  on  the
planet.  Tropical  rainforests,  precious  reservoirs  of  diverse
species, are being destroyed at the rate of over 200,000 square
kilometres a year. It is estimated that the globe’s tropical rain-
forests hold roughly four fifths of all species on earth: if the
rainforests disappear, the diversity of life on the planet will
suffer a devastating blow. We pollute the earth, the oceans and
the air, thus causing a dangerous thinning of the ozone layer,
and global warming (which in turn will cause the polar ice-
caps to melt, and the sea level to rise, flooding some of the
most  densely  populated  regions  on  earth).  We  recklessly
exploit  finite  resources  of  oil,  for  energy  and  transport,
without any idea as to what our sources of energy will be when
the oil runs out.
Given this dreadful record, one can scarcely avoid asking:
will we have to endure similar horrors in the century, or the
millennium, to come? The prospects do not seem good when
one takes into account the continuing rapid rise in world pop-
ulation,  the  depletion  of  finite  natural  resources,  global
warming,  and  the  existence  of  stockpiles  of  conventional,
chemical,  biological  and  nuclear  weapons,  with  the  ever-
present danger of further proliferation.
Is there a possibility that humanity might, during the next
century or so, learn how to avoid perpetrating the worst of
these man-made horrors? It may be that the very future of
humankind is at stake. If we do not learn how to deal more
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of  chemical,  biological  and  nuclear  weaponry  will  be
unleashed upon the world, perhaps annihilating humanity for
ever. (This essay was written well before the horrors of the 11
September  2001;  those  events,  and  the  aftermath  in
Afghanistan and, no doubt, in other places to come, grimly
underline the urgency of these questions.)
Humanity can learn the elements of wisdom and civilisation
required to avoid such horrors in future. But a precondition for
such learning is that we have in existence traditions and insti-
tutions of learning well designed from this standpoint. These,
at present, we do not possess. It may seem incredible, but our
finest  traditions  and  institutions  of  learning,  when  viewed
from the perspective of helping humanity learn civilisation
and wisdom, are disastrously irrational.
Universities all over the world are dominated by the idea
that  the  proper  aim  of  academic  inquiry  is  to  improve
knowledge  and  technological  know-how.  Academic  inquiry
contributes to human welfare by, in the first instance at least,
acquiring knowledge. This means that everything not relevant
to the discovery and assessment of knowledge, such as politics,
values, human hopes and fears, problems of living, must be
excluded from the intellectual domain of inquiry (although
knowledge  about  such  things  is  not,  of  course,  excluded).
Strictly speaking, only that which is relevant to the pursuit of
knowledge, such as factual claims to knowledge, observational
and  experimental  results,  theories  and  arguments,  can  be
permitted to enter academic discussion: everything else must
be  ruthlessly  excluded.  And  this  is  done  in  the  interests  of
acquiring authentic, objective knowledge (as opposed to mere
propaganda  or  ideology)  which  alone  can  be  of  benefit  to
humanity. In the interests of serving humanity, one might say,
academic  inquiry  ignores  humanity’s  problems,  aspirations,
suffering,  and  concentrates  on  acquiring  knowledge  of
objective fact.
Natural science, an immensely influential, prestigious core
to modern academic inquiry, operates an even more severe cen-
sorship system: in order to enter into the intellectual domain
of  science,  an  idea  must  not  just  be  a  factual  claim  to
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testable. 
The limits of ‘knowledge-inquiry’
The conception of inquiry I have just outlined might be called
knowledge-inquiry. It is the dominant conception, exercising a
profound influence over every branch and aspect of current
academic  inquiry.  Knowledge-inquiry  is  widely  taken  for
granted by those academics who see themselves as upholders
of reason. (And those who reject knowledge-inquiry tend to see
themselves as rejecting reason.)
But knowledge-inquiry, when judged from the standpoint of
helping humanity achieve what is of value in life or, in other
words, learn wisdom and civilisation, is so irrational that it
violates three of the four most elementary rules of reason con-
ceivable. What is reason? As I use the term, rationality appeals
to the idea that there is some set of general rules, methods or
strategies which, if put into practice, give us the best chances
of solving our problems or realising our aims. Four elementary
rules of problem-solving rationality are:
1.  Articulate and seek to improve the articulation of the basic
problem(s) to be solved. 
2.  Propose and critically assess alternative possible solutions. 
3.  When necessary, break up the basic problem to be solved
into a number of preliminary, simpler, analogous, subordi-
nate or specialised problems (to be tackled in accordance
with  rules  1  and  2),  in  an  attempt  to  work  gradually
towards a solution to the basic problem to be solved. 
4.  Interconnect  attempts  to  solve  basic  and  specialised
problems, so that basic problem-solving may guide, and be
guided by, specialised problem-solving.
These four rules of reason are elementary, banal and uncon-
troversial. No problem-solving endeavour which violates them
can hope to be rational. But academic inquiry as it exists at
present,  viewed  from  the  perspective  of  helping  humanity
learn wisdom and civilisation, violates three of these four ele-
mentary rules of reason.
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horrors that we have inflicted upon ourselves in the twentieth
century, we have to learn how to solve our problems of living,
our conflicts in life, in more cooperatively rational ways than
we have in the past. It is not primarily new knowledge or tech-
nology that we need; indeed, rapid acquisition of new scien-
tific  knowledge  and  technology  is  a  part  of  the  problem.
Population growth, environmental damage and the statistics
of death through war have all been made possible by twentieth
century science and technology. What we need, rather, is to
discover how to act in new ways. We need new policies, new
institutions, new ways of living, new responses to our local and
global conflicts, our personal and global problems of living.
The problems, then, that inquiry needs to help us solve if it
is to help us realise what is of value in life are fundamentally
problems of living, problems of action. And solutions to these
problems that promote the realisation of what is of value in
life will be increasingly cooperative, appropriate actions, indi-
vidual, social, institutional.
Therefore,  if  academic  inquiry  is  to  pursue  the  aim  of
helping us achieve what is of value in life in a way that puts the
above four rules of reason into practice, then it must give intel-
lectual  priority  to  the  dual  tasks  of  (1)  articulating  our
problems of living, and (2) proposing and critically assessing
possible solutions – possible increasingly cooperative actions.
In  addition,  inquiry  will  need  (3)  to  break  up  our  basic
problems of living into a number of subordinate, specialised
problems of knowledge and technology. But it must also (4)
interconnect attempts to solve basic problems of living and spe-
cialised problems of knowledge and technology, so that basic
problem-solving  may  guide  and  be  guided  by  specialised
problem-solving. Knowledge-inquiry, as it exists in universities
today, puts rule (3) into practice to splendid effect, in that it
creates  an  immense  maze  of  specialised  problems  of
knowledge and technology secondary to our basic problems of
living.  Absolutely  disastrously,  however,  it  fails  to  put  into
practice rules 1, 2 and 4. 
Having  traditions  and  institutions  of  learning  that  are
grossly irrational in this way must lead to widespread disas-
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value, to create a more civilised world, is sabotaged. We are
deprived of a kind of learning that gives intellectual priority to
articulating  our  problems  of  living  and  proposing  and
assessing possible solutions. We need this if we are to learn
how to resolve our conflicts and problems in more cooperative
ways.
Rapidly solving problems of scientific knowledge and tech-
nology in a world that has not learned how to act cooperatively
is  as  likely  to  do  harm  as  good.  Rapid  population  growth,
modern  armaments,  the  increasing  destructiveness  of  war,
environmental  problems,  immense  differences  in  wealth
between  first  and  third  world  countries:  these  are  all  the
outcome  of  our  increased  power  to  act,  made  possible  by
science, without a corresponding increase in our power to act
humanely, cooperatively, and in our long-term interests. The
crisis of our times is the crisis of science without wisdom. And
this,  in  turn,  is  due  to  our  possession  of  a  kind  of  inquiry
rational,  perhaps,  from  the  standpoint  of  improving
knowledge,  but  grossly  irrational  from  the  standpoint  of
improving wisdom. 
Wisdom and values
What,  then,  would  academic  inquiry  be  like  were  it  to  be
devoted  to  helping  us  create  a  better  world  in  a  genuinely
rational way? The basic aim of inquiry would be to promote the
growth of wisdom – wisdom being the desire, the endeavour,
and the capacity to discover and achieve what is of value in life,
for  oneself  and  others.  Wisdom  includes  knowledge,  under-
standing and technological know-how, but goes beyond these
to  include  the  desire  and  striving  for  what  is  of  value;  the
ability to experience, to perceive what is of value; the capacity
to help solve those problems of living that arise in connection
with  attempts  to  realise  what  is  of  value.  Wisdom,  like
knowledge, can be thought of as something possessed not only
by individuals, but also by institutions or societies. 
The  basic  method  of  wisdom-inquiry (as  we  may  call  it)
would be to put the above four rules of reason into practice,
and to promote putting these rules into practice in personal
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mental intellectual tasks of inquiry would be (1) to articulate
our personal and global problems of living, and (2) to propose
and  critically  assess  possible  solutions,  possibly  increasing
cooperative  personal  and  global  actions.  These  tasks,  at  the
heart  of  academic  inquiry,  would  be  carried  out  by  social
inquiry  and  the  humanities.  Social  inquiry  (economics,
sociology, political science, etc) would not primarily be science,
or engaged in the pursuit of knowledge: its task would be to
explore  imaginatively  possible  actions,  possible  policies,
political programmes, institutions, ways of life, to be assessed
from  their  capacity  to  promote  civilisation.  We  urgently
require a wealth of vividly imagined and fiercely scrutinised
possibilities for diverse aspects of our personal and social lives
if we are to discover how to rid ourselves permanently of war,
environmental  degradation,  dictatorships,  injustice,  poverty
and hunger. 
Academic inquiry would also need (3) to break our funda-
mental problems of living into subordinate, more specialised
problems. In this way, the natural and technological sciences
emerge  out  of  social  inquiry,  intellectually  subordinate  to
social inquiry. At the same time, inquiry would need (4) to
interconnect fundamental and specialised problem-solving, so
that each is influenced by the other.  
It  is  essential  that  wisdom-inquiry  is  without  political
power, and is non-authoritarian in character. There can be no
question  of  academics  deciding  for  the  rest  of  us  what  our
problems are, how they should be solved, how we should live
or  what  is  of  value.  Far  from  depriving  us  of  the  power  to
decide for ourselves, the task of wisdom-inquiry is to help us
enhance our power to decide well for ourselves by providing us
with good ideas, proposals and arguments for our considera-
tion. Academics need to engage in debate with non-academics,
but  must  have  no  power  or  authority  to  determine  the
thoughts and decisions of others. Wisdom-inquiry is a sort of
people’s  civil  service,  doing  openly  for  the  public,  with
exemplary intellectual honesty and integrity, what actual civil
services are supposed to do, in secret, for governments.
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and  must  not  degenerate  into  merely  serving  the  special
interests  of  government,  industry,  the  nation,  or  public
opinion. The academic world needs just sufficient power and
authority to retain its independence, but no more. If we are to
believe the pronouncements of experts, this should be because
there  are  good  reasons  to  do  so,  and  not  because  experts
possess some unassailable authority of expertise.
Conclusion: the need for ‘wisdom-inquiry’
It  is  I  hope  clear  from  this  thumbnail  sketch  that  wisdom-
inquiry  differs  dramatically  from  what  we  have  at  present,
knowledge-inquiry.  A  more  detailed  exposition  of  wisdom-
inquiry would further highlight this dramatic difference. We
urgently  need  to  bring  about  a  revolution  in  the  aims  and
methods,  the  overall  character  and  structure  of  academic
inquiry, so that it takes up its proper task of helping humanity
learn wisdom and civilisation. Such a revolution would affect
every  branch  and  aspect  of  academic  inquiry:  the  natural
sciences, social inquiry, and the relationship between the two;
mathematics, the technological sciences, and the humanities;
education; and the way academic inquiry relates to the rest of
society.
1
Could such a revolution occur, and can we learn in future
how to avoid the horrors of the past? At present, academics
show few signs of recognising the need for the required revo-
lution. Will no one take responsibility for creating traditions
and institutions of learning intelligently designed to help us
become civilised?
Nicholas Maxwell is Emeritus Scholar in the Philosophy of
Science at the London School of Economics.
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